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Abstract 
 
The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 ("EEA") has been 
amended to include a specific provision dealing with equal pay 
claims in the form of section 6(4). Section 6(4) of the EEA 
prohibits unfair discrimination in terms and conditions of 
employment between employees performing the same or 
substantially the same work or work of equal value. The Minister 
of Labour has issued Regulations and a Code to assist with the 
implementation of the principle of equal pay. Both the 
Regulations and the Code set out the criteria for assessing work 
of equal value as well as the grounds of justification to a claim of 
equal pay for work of equal value (factors justifying differentiation 
in terms and conditions of employment). The EEA refers to two 
grounds of justification in respect of unfair discrimination claims, 
namely affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the 
job. There is support for the view that these grounds of 
justification are not suitable to equal pay claims. There is a 
contrary view that these grounds of justification can apply to 
equal pay claims. The Labour Courts have not had the 
opportunity to analyse these grounds of justification in the 
context of equal pay claims. It is thus necessary to analyse these 
grounds of justification in order to ascertain whether they provide 
justifications proper to equal pay claims. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the grounds of 
justification of pay discrimination as contained in South African 
law, the Conventions and Materials of the International Labour 
Organisation and the equal pay laws of the United Kingdom. 
Lastly, an analysis will be undertaken to determine whether 
affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job 
provide justifications proper to equal pay claims. 
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1  Introduction 
The Employment Equity Act1 has been amended to include a specific 
provision dealing with equal pay claims in the form of section 6(4). Section 
6(4) of the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in terms and conditions of 
employment between employees performing the same or substantially the 
same work or work of equal value. The Minister of Labour has issued 
Regulations and a Code to assist with the implementation of the principle of 
equal pay.2 Both the Regulations and the Code set out the criteria for 
assessing work of equal value as well as the grounds of justification to a 
claim of equal pay for work of equal value (factors justifying differentiation 
in terms and conditions of employment). The EEA refers to two grounds of 
justification in respect of unfair discrimination claims, namely affirmative 
action and the inherent requirements of the job.3 There is support for the 
view that these grounds of justification are not suitable to equal pay claims.4 
There is a contrary view that these grounds of justification can apply to equal 
pay claims.5 The Labour Courts have not had the opportunity to analyse 
these grounds of justification in the context of equal pay claims. It is thus 
necessary to analyse these grounds of justification in order to ascertain 
whether they provide justifications proper to equal pay claims. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the grounds of justification to pay 
discrimination as contained in South African law, the Conventions and 
Materials of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") and the equal pay 
                                            
* Shamier Ebrahim. LLB (NMMU); LLM Labour Law (cum laude) (Unisa), Senior 
Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa. Advocate of the 
High Court of South Africa. Associate Member of the Pretoria Society of Advocates 
(Pretoria Bar). E-mail: ebrahs1@unisa.ac.za. This article is based on the author's 
unpublished LLM short dissertation titled: A Critical Analysis of Equal Remuneration 
Claims in South African Law (University of South Africa 2014). 
1  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 ("EEA"). 
2  Employment Equity Regulations published in GN R595 in GG 37873 of 1 August 
2014 ("Regulations"); Code of Good Practice on Equal Pay/Remuneration for Work 
of Equal Value published in GN 448 in GG 38837 of 1 June 2015 ("Code"). 
3  Section 6(2)(a)-(b) of the EEA. 
4  Meintjes-Van der Walt 1998 ILJ 30, who submitted that a pay differential should not 
be justified on the grounds of affirmative action; Cohen 2000 SA Merc LJ 260-261, 
who stated that both the defences of affirmative action and the inherent requirements 
of the job do not apply directly to pay discrimination; Pieterse 2001 SALJ 17, who 
suggested that pay equity legislation should include specific defences to pay equity 
claims; Hlongwane 2007 LDD 78, who stated that the EEA does not expressly 
provide for defences to pay discrimination and it is difficult to reconcile how the 
defences of affirmative action or the inherent requirements of the job could justify 
pay discrimination.  
5  Landman 2002 SA Merc LJ 353, who suggested that affirmative action is a suitable 
ground of justification to equal remuneration claims and the inherent requirements 
of the job as a ground of justification is possible in theory. 
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laws of the United Kingdom. Lastly, an analysis will be undertaken to 
determine whether affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the 
job provide justifications proper to equal pay claims. 
2 The Employment Equity Act and the Employment Equity 
Regulations 
Section 6(2) of the EEA provides that it is not unfair discrimination to take 
affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of the Act or to 
distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent 
requirement of a job. The grounds of justification are thus affirmative action 
and the inherent requirements of the job. Section 6(4) of the EEA now 
provides for an explicit provision upon which an equal pay claim can be 
based. The section introduces three causes of action in this regard; (a) 
equal pay for the same work, (b) equal pay for substantially the same work 
and (c) equal pay for work of equal value. There is no section in the EEA 
which specifically sets out the grounds of justification to equal pay claims. 
The legislature has thus found it important to include a specific provision in 
the EEA to deal with equal pay claims but has not found it important to 
include a section which sets out the specific grounds of justification relevant 
to an equal pay claim. There is also no section which states that affirmative 
action and the inherent requirements of the job do not apply to equal pay 
claims. In the absence thereof, affirmative action and the inherent 
requirements of the job apply to equal pay claims. The Regulations then 
goes on to set out factors which would justify pay differentiation. These 
factors are: (a) seniority (length of service); (b) qualifications, ability and 
competence; (c) performance (quality of work); (d) where an employee is 
demoted as a result of organisational restructuring (or any other legitimate 
reason) without a reduction in pay and his salary remains the same until the 
remuneration of his co-employees in the same job category reaches his 
level (red-circling); (e) where a person is employed temporarily for the 
purpose of gaining experience (training) and as a result thereof receives 
different remuneration; (f) skills scarcity; and (g) any other relevant factor.6 
The cardinal question which arises is: do affirmative action and the inherent 
requirements of the job apply to equal pay claims in the light of the fact that 
the grounds justifying pay differentiation are specifically set out in the 
Regulations and the Code? It cannot be assumed that affirmative action and 
the inherent requirements of the job do not apply to equal pay claims 
                                            
6  Regulation 7(1)(a)-(g) of the Regulations. This list of factors is repeated in item 7.3.1-
7.3.7 of the Code.  
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because the factors justifying pay differentiation are set out in the 
Regulations and the Code, as these grounds of justification are set out in 
the EEA, which is primary legislation and not subordinate legislation, as is 
the case with the Regulations and the Code. 
3 South African case law 
In SA Chemical Workers Union v Sentrachem Ltd7 the applicants alleged 
that the respondent discriminated against its black employees by paying 
them less than their white counterparts who were employed on the same 
grade or engaged in the same work. The Industrial Court held that wage 
discrimination based on race or any other difference other than skills and 
experience8 was an unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court found that 
the respondent acknowledged the wage discrimination as alleged and 
committed itself to remove it. As a result thereof, the Industrial Court ordered 
the respondent to remove the wage discrimination based on race within a 
period of six months.9 It is clear that the principle of equal remuneration for 
equal work was recognised in this case.10 It is further clear that the Industrial 
Court considered skills and experience to be objective and fair factors upon 
which to pay black employees less than their white counterparts.11 
In National Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd12 the applicant 
alleged that the respondent's refusal to implement wage increases to union 
members retrospectively constituted an unfair labour practice. The 
Industrial Court remarked that as an abstract principle, it is self-evident that 
equals should be treated equally. It further remarked that employees having 
the same seniority and in the same job category should receive the same 
terms and conditions of employment unless there are good and compelling 
reasons to differentiate between them. The Industrial Court ordered the 
                                            
 7  SA Chemical Workers Union v Sentrachem Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 410 (IC) (hereafter 
referred to as "Sentrachem I"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour 
Relations Act 28 of 1956, which has been repealed. 
8  Emphasis added. The Industrial Court in its order at Sentrachem I 439H also refers 
to length of service in the job as a fair criterion for paying black employees less than 
their white counterparts. 
9  Sentrachem I 412F, 429F, 430E-F, 439H. 
10  Cohen 2000 SA Merc LJ 260 has stated that the principle of equal pay for equal work 
was established in this case. 
11  Emphasis added.  
12  National Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 1149 (IC) 
(hereafter referred to as "Henry Gould"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of 
the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 which has been repealed. 
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respondent to pay the union members the relevant amount of wages.13 It 
regarded seniority as a fair and objective factor to pay different wages.14 
In Sentrachem Ltd v John,15 the High Court noted that it was common cause 
between the parties that a practice in which a black employee is paid a 
lesser wage than his white counterpart who is engaged in the same work 
whilst both have the same length of service, qualifications and skills 
constitutes an unfair labour practice based on unfair wage discrimination. 
The High Court remarked that this was the correct exposition of the law.16 
This was a review application against the award made in Sentrachem I 
regarding the wage discrimination based on race. This award was set aside 
by the High Court for lack of an evidential basis to make the award.17 The 
High Court regarded length of service, qualifications and skills as fair and 
objective factors in law to pay different wages.18 
In Mthembu v Claude Neon Lights,19 the respondent instructed its local 
management to evaluate each employee and make recommendations as to 
whether the employee should receive an increase in pay based on merit. 
Local management decided that two employees should not receive a merit 
increase. This decision gave rise to the application. The Industrial Court 
held that discrimination was absent and that it would not be in the interests 
of employers or employees to order that an employer is not entitled to 
differentiate between employees based on their productivity. It further held 
that an employer is entitled to reward an employee with a merit increase as 
that increases productivity.20 It is clear from this case that the Industrial 
Court regarded productivity as a fair and objective factor for paying different 
wages.21 
                                            
13  Henry Gould 1150E, 1158A-B, 1161I. 
14  Emphasis added.  
15  Sentrachem Ltd v John 1989 10 ILJ 249 (WLD) (hereafter referred to as 
"Sentrachem II"). 
16  Campanella 1991 ILJ 29 has stated that the principle of equal pay for equal work 
was cemented in this case. 
17  Sentrachem II 259B-C, 250I, 259D, 263J. 
18  Emphasis added. 
19  Mthembu v Claude Neon Lights 1992 13 ILJ 422 (IC) (hereafter referred to as 
"Mthembu"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 
of 1956, which has been repealed. 
20  Mthembu 423B-C, 423E-G. 
21  Emphasis added. See Campanella 1991 ILJ 27, who suggested that the presiding 
officer in Mthembu's case regarded productivity as a ground of justification to pay 
differentiation; Campanella 1991 ILJ 29-30 has stated that equal pay for equal work 
is a crucial element in order to achieve a non-discriminatory policy, and employers 
should not labour under the misapprehension that productivity is a universally fair 
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In TGWU v Bayete Security Holdings22 the applicant admitted that he was 
not aware of the nature of the work performed by his comparator; neither 
was he aware of his comparator's educational qualifications or experience. 
The Labour Court remarked that the applicant expected it to infer that he 
was discriminated against on the ground of race on the basis that he was 
black and earned R1 500 whilst his white comparator earned R4 500. The 
Labour Court held that the applicant had not succeeded in proving that he 
had been discriminated against. It further held that the mere difference in 
pay between employees does not in itself amount to discrimination. The 
Labour Court remarked that discrimination takes place when two similarly 
circumstanced employees are treated differently on the prohibited grounds. 
It further remarked that responsibility, expertise, experience, skills and the 
like could justify pay differentials. The application was consequently 
dismissed.23 The Labour Court regarded responsibility, expertise, 
experience, skills and the like as fair and objective factors for paying 
different wages.24 
In Heynsen v Armstrong Hydraulics (Pty) Ltd25 the applicant (a quality 
control inspector) alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of 
race in that he earned less than his co-employees (quality control 
inspectors) who were part of the bargaining unit and who were weekly paid. 
The applicant did not belong to the bargaining unit and was monthly paid 
but the work performed was the same as that of his co-employees. The 
applicant sought an order directing the respondent to remunerate him on an 
equal pay for equal work basis. The Labour Court noted that there were 
differences in the terms and conditions of employment with regard to weekly 
paid and monthly paid employees.26 It further noted that monthly paid 
employees were entitled to certain benefits which hourly paid employees 
did not enjoy. The Labour Court held that it would not be fair if employees 
who were not part of the bargaining unit were to benefit from that unit while 
they still enjoyed benefits which were not shared by the bargaining unit. The 
Labour Court noted that according to the ILO, collective bargaining is not a 
                                            
ground of differentiation, because its fairness is dependent on objective criteria 
which should be applied objectively. 
22  TGWU v Bayete Security Holdings 1999 4 BLLR 401 (LC) (hereafter referred to as 
"TGWU"). This matter came before the Labour Court in terms of item 2(1)(a) of 
Schedule 7 of the LRA, which has since been repealed.  
23  TGWU paras 5, 4, 7, 10. 
24  Emphasis added.  
25  Heynsen v Armstrong Hydraulics (Pty) Ltd 2000 12 BLLR 1444 (LC) (hereafter 
referred to as "Heynsen"). 
26  Heynsen paras 1, 3-4, 6, 10-11. 
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justification for pay discrimination.27 It cautioned that this rule was 
compelling in an ideal society and should not apply rigidly in South African 
labour relations due to the fact that collective bargaining was a hard-fought 
right for employees. The Labour Court characterised the applicant's 
complaint as wanting to have his cake and eat it. It found that insofar as 
their might be discrimination, it was not unfair, based on the facts. The 
application was consequently dismissed.28 The Labour Court regarded 
collective bargaining as a possible fair and objective factor for paying 
different wages.29 
In Ntai v SA Breweries Ltd30 the applicants, black people, alleged that their 
employer committed unfair discrimination based on race in that it paid them 
a lower salary than their white counterparts whilst all of them were engaged 
in the same work or work of equal value. The applicants sought an order 
that their employer pay them a salary equal to that of their white 
counterparts. The respondent admitted that there was a difference in the 
salaries but denied that the cause of the difference was based on race. The 
respondent attributed the difference in pay to a series of performance-based 
pay increments, the greater experience of the comparators, and their 
seniority. The Labour Court accepted that the applicants had made out a 
prima facie case but noted that they still bore the overall onus of proving 
that the difference in pay was based on race. It found that the applicants 
had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the reason for the 
different salaries was based on race. The application was consequently 
dismissed.31 The Labour Court remarked that the respondent had no legal 
duty to apply affirmative action measures and somehow increase the 
salaries of the applicants. It further remarked that the application of an 
affirmative action measure was a defence which could be relied upon by an 
employer and did not constitute a right which an employee could use. The 
Labour Court noted that indirect discrimination exists when an ostensibly 
                                            
27  Heynsen refers to s 111 of the Directions of the ILO. It is submitted that this should 
be read as referring to art 2(e) of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Recommendation 111 of 1958.  
28  Heynsen paras 8, 12-13, 15, 17-18. 
29  Emphasis added. Also see Larbi Ordam v Member of the Executive Council for 
Education (North-West Province) 1997 12 BCLR 1655 (CC) para 28, wherein the 
Constitutional Court held that an agreed regulation whi ch unfairly discriminates 
against a minority will not constitute a ground of justification; and Jansen van Vuuren 
v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2013 10 BLLR 1004 (LC) paras 48-50, wherein the 
Labour Court held that a collective agreement cannot justify unfair discrimination. 
30  Ntai v SA Breweries Ltd 2001 22 ILJ 214 (LC) (hereafter referred to as "Ntai"). This 
matter came before the Labour Court in terms of item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 of the 
LRA, which has since been repealed. 
31  Ntai paras 2-3, 5, 25, 21, 57, 61, 90. 
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neutral requirement adversely affects a disproportionate number of people 
from a protected group and it may also arise in the case of equal pay for 
work of equal value.32 It further noted that the use of ostensibly neutral 
requirements such as seniority and experience in the computation of pay 
could have an adverse impact on employees from the protected group if it 
was proved that such factors affected the employees as a group 
disproportionately when compared with their white counterparts who 
performed the same work.33 
In Co-operative Worker Association v Petroleum Oil and Gas Co-operative 
of SA34 the second applicant alleged that the respondent committed unfair 
discrimination based on the absence of family responsibility in that 
employees with family responsibility (dependent spouses and children) 
received a higher total guaranteed remuneration than employees without 
family responsibility and this violated the principle of the right to equal pay 
for equal work or work of equal value. The Labour Court noted that the 
international community acknowledged the fact that workers with family 
responsibilities constituted a vulnerable group and are deserving of 
protection. Additional remuneration for these employees was endorsed and 
encouraged in terms of both national and international law.35 The Labour 
Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the definition of family 
responsibility made it clear that only those employees with dependants may 
utilise section 6(1) on the ground of family responsibility. The applicants 
could therefore not claim unfair discrimination on the basis of the absence 
of family responsibility, which is the corollary of the listed ground of family 
responsibility. The claim was consequently dismissed.36 The Labour Court 
regarded the absence of family responsibility as a justification for paying 
different wages.37 
In Mangena v Fila South Africa (Pty) Ltd38 the applicant, a black male, 
alleged that the respondent discriminated against him on the ground of race 
in that it paid his chosen comparator, a white female, a higher salary even 
though the work performed by both of them was the same or alternatively 
                                            
32  Ntai paras 85-86. 
33  Ntai paras 79-80. 
34  Co-operative Worker Association v Petroleum Oil and Gas Co-operative of SA 2007 
1 BLLR 55 (LC) (hereafter referred to as "Co-operative Worker Association"). 
35  Co-operative Worker Association paras 6, 8, 42, 51. 
36  Co-operative Worker Association paras 47, 36, 60. 
37  Emphasis added.  
38  Mangena v Fila South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2009 12 BLLR 1224 (LC) (hereafter referred 
to as "Mangena"). 
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of equal value.39 The Labour Court found that the applicant had an 
exaggerated view of the nature of the work performed by him and it rejected 
his evidence as to the nature of the work performed by both him and the 
comparator and instead accepted the respondent's version in this regard. It 
found that the applicant had failed to establish that the work performed by 
him and the comparator was the same/similar.40 The Labour Court then 
noted that the applicant had not pleaded a claim of equal pay for work of 
equal value. The applicant argued that the Court could take a view on the 
facts before it as to the relative value of the respective work. The Labour 
Court remarked that to the extent that the issue of relative value was self-
evident, the work which the applicant was engaged in was of considerably 
less value than that performed by the comparator taking into account the 
demands made, levels of responsibility and skills in relation to both jobs. It 
stated that an applicant claiming equal pay for work of equal value must lay 
a proper factual foundation of the work performed by himself and that of his 
chosen comparator to enable the court to make an assessment as to what 
value should be attributed to the work. This factual foundation might include 
evidence of skill, effort, responsibility and the like in relation to the work of 
both the claimant and the comparator.41 
In Duma v Minister of Correctional Services42 the applicant (Duma) 
launched her claim for equal pay for the same work in the Labour Court. 
The matter was eventually set down for decision before the Labour Court in 
terms of a stated case. She was appointed to the post of Senior Correctional 
Officer: Manager: Legal Services at Voorberg in the Western Cape. This 
position was advertised at salary level 8 and Duma filled this post with effect 
from 1 August 2006. According to the stated case, it was agreed that the 
Manager: Legal Services positions in Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North-West 
and Kwazulu-Natal, inter alia, were on salary level 9. It was further agreed 
that this position should be at salary level 9 in terms of the Department's 
organisational structure, job description and title. It was agreed that there 
were disparities between various employees performing work with the same 
job description at different levels of pay. Duma brought this disparity to the 
attention of the Department, in particular, that her salary level be moved 
                                            
39  Mangena paras 2, 4. This claim represents the first part of the claim in the case 
which relates to the applicant, Shabalala. The second and third parts of the claim will 
not be dealt with. 
40  Mangena para 14. 
41  Mangena para 15. 
42  Duma v Minister of Correctional Services 2016 6 BLLR 601 (LC) (hereafter referred 
to as "Duma"). 
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from level 8 to level 9, but no action was taken by the Department to correct 
it.43 
The Labour Court noted that Duma relied on section 6(1) of the EEA for her 
claim of unfair discrimination relating to equal pay. She relied upon the 
unlisted ground of "geographical location". The Court held that the basis for 
the differentiation which was the fact that Duma was employed by the 
Department in one province and not another, appeared to be entirely 
arbitrary. The Labour Court noted that the amended section 6(1) of the EEA, 
which was not applicable in this case, was amended to prohibit unfair 
discrimination on any other arbitrary ground. It held further that the use of 
the ground of geographical location as a basis for paying employees in one 
province less than employees in another province for the same work has 
the ability to impair the dignity of those employees in a manner comparable 
to the listed grounds and amounts to discrimination. The Labour Court 
stated that the respondents' baldly denied that it unfairly discriminated 
against Duma. They failed to explain the reason as to why Senior 
Correctional Officers in the Western Cape were on a lower salary level than 
their counterparts in other provinces. The Court held that the respondents 
were more concerned with the remedy that the applicant sought and 
whether it was competent for the Court to grant same.44 
The Labour Court held that Duma had successfully proved that she was 
unfairly discriminated against with regard to her pay. It made the following 
compensation orders: (a) the respondents were ordered to pay Duma an 
amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration she had 
received from August 2009 to the date of the order and the remuneration 
she would have received during that period had she been graded on level 
9; and (b) to adjust her monthly salary to align with the current remuneration 
entitlement of an employee who had her job description and who was on 
salary level 9.45 
In Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression46 the Labour 
Court heard an appeal in terms of section 10(8) of the EEA against an 
arbitration award of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) in which the Commissioner found that paying newly 
appointed drivers at an 80% rate for the first two years of employment as 
                                            
43  Duma paras 1, 6, 8.  
44  Duma paras 19, 21, 23.  
45  Duma paras 25-26.  
46  Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Workers Against Regression 2016 9 BLLR 942 (LC) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Pioneer Foods") 
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opposed to the 100% rate paid to drivers working longer than two years in 
terms of a collective agreement amounted to unfair discrimination in pay. 
The CCMA in essence regarded the factor of seniority as a ground of 
discrimination as opposed to a ground justifying pay differentiation. The 
issue before the court was the interpretation of section 6(4) of the EEA, and 
in particular the issue of the factor of seniority operating as a ground of 
discrimination. The Workers against Regression ("union") wanted their 
members to be remunerated at the same rate as those employees who had 
been working for longer than two years at the appellant. They thus sought 
a 20% increase in their members' remuneration to bring it in line with the 
comparator employees' rate.47 
The appellant, in accordance with a collective agreement concluded with 
the Food and Allied Workers Union ("FAWU"), pays newly appointed 
employees for the first two years of their employment at 80% of the rate paid 
to its longer serving employees, after which the rate would be increased to 
100%. The Commissioner found that by applying this to its employees, the 
appellant had unfairly discriminated against them. He ordered that the rate 
of remuneration be changed to 100% for newly appointed employees and 
that damages be paid to the members of the union. The Labour Court found 
that the equal pay framework regards the factor of seniority as a ground 
which justifies pay differentiation and the Commissioner had misconceived 
the law by regarding it as a ground upon which pay discrimination was 
committed. The Labour Court found that the Commissioner determined the 
arbitration unfairly and he had made an award that was contrary to the case 
argued by the union.48 
The Labour Court found that the Commissioner's approach was that it 
amounts to unfair discrimination for the appellant to pay a newly appointed 
employee who was previously employed by a labour broker at a lower rate 
than the rate paid to existing long-service employees, irrespective of how 
short the period of previous employment with the labour broker was. The 
lower rate of remuneration for newly appointed employees as contained in 
the collective agreement between FAWU and the appellant came about as 
a result of FAWU's persuading the appellant to reduce the extent to which 
it was using the services of various forms of precarious employees, 
including employees supplied by labour brokers. FAWU also proposed the 
implementation of a scale that showed the difference between employees 
who had newly started working and long-serving employees. The 80% 
                                            
47  Pioneer Foods paras 1-5.  
48  Pioneer Foods paras 5, 32-33, 36-37, 57.  
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scale/rate was applied to all new employees from outside the company and 
it ceased to operate after two years of service. The Labour Court found that 
the differentiation complained of was not irrational, was not based on an 
arbitrary unlisted ground, and was not unfair. The appeal was thus upheld.49 
3.1 The factors emerging from the South African case law 
It is clear from the aforementioned analysis of the case law that the following 
factors have been regarded as fair and objective (neutral) for justifying pay 
differentials: (a) skills;50 (b) experience;51 (c) seniority;52 (d) length of 
service;53 (e) qualifications;54 (f) productivity;55 (g) responsibility;56 (h) 
collective bargaining (agreements);57 (i) absence of family responsibility;58 
and (j) objective job evaluation methods.59 
4 Grounds of Justification from the ILO 
The Equal Remuneration Convention60 does not set out the 
defences/grounds of justification to equal pay claims, but states that 
differential rates between workers that are determined by an objective 
appraisal which is free from discrimination based on sex shall not be 
                                            
49  Pioneer Foods paras 44, 46-48, 76.  
50  Sentrachem I 429F; Sentrachem II 259B-C; TGWU para 7. 
51  Sentrachem I 429F; TGWU para 7; Ntai para 80. 
52  Henry Gould 1158A-B; Ntai para 80; Pioneer Foods para 57; Landman 2002 SA 
Merc LJ 354 has stated that the basing of pay differentials on seniority is a 
recognised defence; Meintjes-Van Der Walt 1998 ILJ 30 relying on foreign law has 
stated that a bona fide seniority system is an acceptable ground of justification to 
pay differentials.  
53  Sentrachem II 259B-C. 
54  Sentrachem II 259B-C. 
55  Mthembu 423E-G; Landman 2002 SA Merc LJ 353-354 referring to s 32 of the 
Ontario Employment Standards Act of 1990 has stated that merit has been accepted 
as a ground of justification for pay differentials; Meintjes-Van Der Walt 1998 ILJ 30 
relying on foreign law has stated that a merit system based on objective criteria is 
an acceptable ground of justification to pay differentials. It is clear from Mthembu's 
case that merit is linked to productivity. 
56  TGWU para 7. 
57  Heynsen paras 12-13, 17; Landman 2002 SA Merc LJ 351 has stated that an 
employer can attempt to rely on a collective agreement that provides for 
discriminatory wages as a ground of justification for pay differentials but this reliance 
is unlikely to succeed; Grogan Employment Rights 230 relying on SA Union of 
Journalists v South African Broadcasting Corporation 1999 20 ILJ 2840 (LAC) has 
stated that collective bargaining agreements with different unions which result in pay 
differentials are permissible.  
58  Co-operative Worker Association paras 36, 47. 
59  Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd 2000 21 ILJ 188 (LC) para 106; Pieterse 
2001 SALJ 17 has suggested that the use of specific objective job evaluation 
methods will prevent perpetuating disadvantage. 
60  Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951. 
S EBRAHIM  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  13 
considered to be contrary to the principle of equal pay for equal work or 
work of equal value.61 The Equal Remuneration Convention does not set 
out the defences/grounds of justification which may be raised in an equal 
remuneration claim, neither does the Equal Pay Guide62 set it out. What is 
clear from the ILO, however, is that the use of objective appraisals (job 
evaluation methods) or objective factors to determine the value of the work 
can (successfully) be raised as a defence to an equal pay claim, as it is not 
contrary to the principle of equal pay. 
5 Equality Act of the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, a claimant may approach the employment tribunal 
with an equal pay claim.63 The tribunal must then determine whether there 
has been unequal pay in the particular case. An employer faced with a prima 
facie case of unequal pay may raise the genuine material factor defence. 
The employer has the onus of proving the defence on a balance of 
probabilities. The successful raising of the defence means that the 
difference in the terms and conditions of employment is due to a material 
factor which is not the difference of sex.64 Section 69 of the Equality Act65 
sets out the genuine material factor defence in the following subsections  as 
follows: 
(1) The sex equality clause in A's terms has no effect in relation to a 
difference between A's terms and B's terms if the responsible person 
shows that the difference is because of a material factor reliance on 
which- 
(a) does not involve treating A less favourably because of A's sex than 
the responsible person treats B, and 
(b) if the factor is within subsection (2), is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim. 
(2) A factor is within this subsection if A shows that, as a result of the 
factor, A and persons of the same sex doing work equal to A's are put 
                                            
61  Article 3 of the Equal Remuneration Convention 100 of 1951.  
62  Oelz, Olney and Manuel Equal Pay Guide. 
63  Smith and Baker Employment Law 372. 
64  Smith and Baker Employment Law 366. Item 8 of the Equal Pay Statutory Code of 
Practice to the Equality Act of 2010 states that "Historically, women have often been 
paid less than men for doing the same or equivalent work and this inequality has 
persisted in some areas." The Code further states that the provisions relating to 
equal pay and sex discrimination in the Equality Act of 2010 are intended to ensure 
that pay and other employment terms are determined without sex discrimination or 
bias and even though the Code relates to equal pay between men and women, pay 
systems may be challenged on grounds of race, age or other protected 
characteristics under the Equality Act of 2010 (items 9 and 11).  
65  Equality Act of 2010 ("EA").  
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at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons of the 
opposite sex doing work equal to A's.66 
It is clear from subsection (1)(a) of section 69 that if the reason for treating 
A (the aggrieved employee) and B (the comparator) differently in relation to 
their terms of employment is not based on sex, then this is a complete 
defence to an equal pay claim. Subsection (1)(b) of section 69 permits 
discrimination in terms and conditions of employment based on sex if the 
reason for doing so constitutes a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. At first blush this section seems to be counterproductive to 
what the EA seeks to achieve, but this is clarified in subsection (3) of section 
69, which states that: 
[f]or the purposes of subsection (1), the long-term objective of reducing 
inequality between men's and women's terms of work is always to be regarded 
as a legitimate aim. 
Section 131(6)(a)-(b) of the EA provides that a job evaluation study that is 
not based on a system that discriminates on the ground of sex and that is 
reliable constitutes a defence to an equal pay claim. Item 42 of the Equal 
Pay Code67 states that: 
[i]f a job evaluation study has assessed the woman's job as being of lower 
value than her male comparator's job, then an equal value claim will fail unless 
the Employment Tribunal has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
evaluation was tainted by discrimination or was in some other way unreliable. 
5.1 Grounds of justification 
It is clear from the above analysis of the EA that the following are regarded 
as defences to an equal pay claim:  
(a)  the genuine material factor defence68 and;  
(b)  a job evaluation study that is not based on a system that 
discriminates on the ground of sex and that is reliable.69 
                                            
66  Section 69(1)-(2) of the EA. 
67  Equal Pay Statutory Code of Practice to the Equality Act of 2010 ("Equal Pay Code").  
68  Section 69 of the EA. 
69  Section 131(6)(a)-(b) of the EA. Item 42 of the Equal Pay Code states that "[i]f a job 
evaluation study has assessed the woman's job as being of lower value than her 
male comparator's job, then an equal value claim will fail unless the Employment 
Tribunal has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the evaluation was tainted by 
discrimination or was in some other way unreliable". 
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5.2 The case law 
It should be noted that the case law decided under the repealed Equal Pay 
Act,70 which provided for the right to equal pay for work of equal value, and 
the defences thereto will be analysed below, in addition to the case law 
decided under the EA. These cases, whilst decided under repealed 
legislation, are instructive and provide an invaluable insight as to how the 
courts have (previously) dealt with the specific issues relating to equal pay 
claims and how they might (possibly) deal with these issues in future 
litigation. Case law decided under the repealed EPA cannot be disregarded 
as it forms part of the jurisprudence relating to equal pay claims. It should 
further be noted that the case law decided by the European Court of Justice 
and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal will be referred to, but only to a 
limited extent. Reference to these cases under the analysis of the case law 
in the United Kingdom should not be surprising, as the tribunals and courts 
in the United Kingdom readily make reference to the decisions of these 
courts in their judgments.  
5.2.1  Case law dealing with the grounds of justification to equal pay claims 
In Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling71 the respondent was employed 
by the Prison Service, which fell under the appellant, as a service desk user 
support team customer service adviser. The respondent claimed in the 
Employment Tribunal that she was doing like work to that of her chosen 
male comparator, but was paid less than him. The male comparator held 
the same post as the respondent but started on a salary of £15, 567 as 
opposed to the respondent who started on £14, 762. The difference 
between the starting salaries was due to the comparator being appointed 
on spinal point 3 in terms of the appellant's salary scale and the 
respondent's being appointed on spinal point 1. The appellant argued that 
the reason for this difference was due to the fact that the comparator had 
more background and experience than the respondent. The Employment 
Tribunal accepted this explanation in respect of the difference in pay that 
had existed at the time of appointment. The Employment Tribunal, however, 
held that this explanation could not apply to the period where the respondent 
and the comparator had achieved the same appraisal rating, because at 
that stage the reason of skill and experience had ceased to be a material 
factor which could be relied on for paying different wages for like work. It 
                                            
70 Equal Pay Act of 1970 ("EPA"). This Act was the predecessor to the EA in respect 
of equal pay claims. 
71  Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling [2012] IRLR 382 EAT. 
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therefore allowed the respondent's claim in part.72 On appeal, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted the appellant's argument that "it is 
in the nature of an incremental scale that where an employee starts on the 
scale will impact on his pay, relative to his colleagues', in each subsequent 
year until they reach the top". The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted 
that a differential was built into the pay of the respondent once the 
comparator had been appointed two points above the respondent in terms 
of the salary scale and if the original differential was free from sex 
discrimination then it follows that the differentials in later years too were free 
from sex discrimination. The appeal was consequently allowed.73 Where 
two employees doing like work are appointed on different levels of a salary 
scale due to skill and experience which is free from unfair discrimination, 
then the difference in pay in later years will not amount to unfair 
discrimination. This is only logical. If one employee is appointed on a higher 
scale than the other and both employees perform well, then the one 
employee will almost always receive higher wages than the other. It is 
                                            
72  Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling [2012] IRLR 382 EAT paras 1, 2.1 - 2.3, 5.  
73  Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling [2012] IRLR 382 EAT paras 6-7, 11. In Skills 
Development Scotland v Buchanan [2011] EqLR 955 EAT para 20, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal held that "in an equal value case, if the employer establishes a 
genuine explanation - not a sham, fraud or pretense - for the variation in the contracts 
and that explanation does not involve sex, then he need not go further. In particular, 
he need not show objective justification. If the employer proves a gender neutral 
explanation for the difference in pay, that is sufficient. In an individual case, it may 
seem that the explanation for the difference demonstrates that it is unfair or 
unjustified on moral grounds but that is not relevant". In Glasgow City Council v 
Marshall [2000] IRLR 272 HL 276, the House of Lords made the following comments 
with regard to an employer rebutting a presumption of sex discrimination relating to 
unequal pay: "In order to discharge this burden the employer must satisfy the tribunal 
on several matters. First, that the proffered explanation, or reason, is genuine, and 
not a sham or pretense. Secondly, that the less favourable treatment is due to this 
reason. The factor relied upon must be the cause of the disparity. In this regard, and 
in this sense, the factor must be a 'material' factor, that is, a significant and relevant 
factor. Third, that the reason is not 'the difference of sex'. This phrase is apt to 
embrace any form of sex discrimination, whether direct or indirect. Fourth, that the 
factor relied upon is or, in a case within section 1(2)(c), may be a 'material' difference, 
that is, a significant and relevant difference, between the woman's case and the 
man's case". In Coventry City Council v Nicholls [2009] IRLR 345 EAT para 12, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal held that an employer relying on a genuine material 
factor defence must demonstrate what that factor is and that the factor is: "(a) A 
genuine reason and not a sham or a pretense, which existed and was known to the 
employer at the date that the pay was fixed and which continues to the point of the 
hearing; (b) That the less favourable treatment is due to this reason. The factor must 
be a material factor and must be causative, not just justificatory; (c) The reason must 
not be the difference of sex. This can include direct or indirect discrimination; (d) The 
factor relied upon is a significant and relevant difference between the woman's case 
and the man's case; (e) If the factor relied upon is indirectly discriminatory on the 
grounds of sex, that reliance upon it is justified". 
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submitted that this case may apply mutatis mutandis to a claim of equal pay 
for work of equal value and is not confined to equal pay for like work only. 
In Council of the City of Sunderland v Brennan74 female employees 
(caterers, cleaners, carers, school support staff) of the appellant claimed 
that their work was rated as equivalent or was of equal value to that of their 
male comparators (gardeners, road sweepers, drivers and refuse 
collectors) but they had not received bonus payments which had been 
received by their comparators. The appellant argued in the Employment 
Tribunal that the reason for non-payment was linked to productivity. The 
Tribunal held that "the bonus schemes enjoyed by the predominantly male 
groups "had long ceased to have anything to do with productivity." The 
appellant aggrieved by this finding unsuccessfully appealed the same to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal. The England and Wales Court of Appeal held 
that the fact that the ultimate withdrawal of the bonus system had not 
impacted on productivity in the sense of its being decreased led to a 
"permissible inference that the bonus system had long since ceased to 
relate to productivity". The Appeal was accordingly dismissed.75 Pay 
differentials between the sexes cannot be justified in terms of a bonus 
system which has no bearing on productivity, which was the factor which it 
sought to reward. There must be a link between productivity and the bonus 
system.  
In Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge (No 2)76 the England 
and Wales Court of Appeal dealt with three consolidated appeals 
concerning questions of law relating to claims of equal pay and the scope 
of the defences. Only the law relating to the scope of collective agreements 
as a defence to equal pay claims will be considered. The Court of Appeal 
held that the fact that different jobs have been subject to separate collective 
bargaining processes can be a complete defence to an equal pay claim. It 
                                            
74  Council of the City of Sunderland v Brennan [2012] IRLR 507 EWCA. 
75  Council of the City of Sunderland v Brennan [2012] IRLR 507 EWCA paras 1, 6-7, 
10, 27, 42. In Cumbria County Council v Dow (No 1) [2008] IRLR 91 EAT paras 130, 
133, 135-136, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the appellant's productivity 
(bonus) scheme did not achieve a legitimate objective because the appellant had 
failed to apply it rigorously and this resulted in the payments made according to the 
scheme forming part of the basic wage. The Employment Appeal Tribunal further 
held that a Tribunal is entitled to seek "evidence that productivity had increased as 
a result of improvements in the performance of the workers themselves". It is clear 
from this case that a bonus scheme that is intended to reward productivity must do 
just that. Where the scheme ceases to reward productivity then it loses its status of 
being a legitimate means of improving productivity and will fail as a ground justifying 
pay differentials.  
76  Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge (No 2) [2008] IRLR 776 EWCA. 
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qualified this, however, by stating that collective bargaining can be a 
defence only where the reason for the pay differential is the separate 
collective bargaining and not the difference of sex. It held that where 
separate bargaining has the effect that group of a particular sex (females) 
of similar proportions earns less than another group of a particular sex 
(males) of similar proportions, this could constitute a complete defence to 
an equal pay claim which is not sex-tainted. It further held that this would 
not apply where there is a marked difference between the two groups, 
because the difference would constitute evidence from which a Tribunal 
could infer that the process of the separate bargaining was tainted by sex 
unless the employer furnishes a different explanation. It concluded by 
stating that "the fact of separate collective bargaining would not, of itself, be 
likely to disprove the possibility of sex discrimination".77 Where separate 
collective bargaining is raised by the employer as a justification to pay 
differentials between the sexes, the employer has to show that it was not 
sex-tainted. This applies to a scenario where there is a marked difference 
in the sex of the groups because a Tribunal will be entitled to infer that the 
process was sex-tainted. It is further clear from this case that where the pay 
differentials apply to two different groups of similar proportions then  there 
is no inference to be drawn that the process was or is sex tainted. 
In Benveniste v University of Southampton78 the appellant had taken up 
employment with the respondent in 1981. It was common cause that the 
salary offered to the appellant was less than what she would have been 
offered had there been no financial constraints on the respondent in 1981. 
The appellant accepted the offer of employment on the understanding that 
she would be paid the salary that she would have been entitled to had there 
been no financial constraints on the respondent, once the constraints 
ceased to exist. The respondent's financial constraints came to an end in 
1982. The respondent undertook to increase the appellant's salary slightly 
by means of pay increments but the appellant found this to be 
unsatisfactory. There were several correspondences between the appellant 
                                            
77  Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge (No 2) [2008] IRLR 776 EWCA 
paras 2-3, 181, 198. In British Road Services Ltd v Loughran [1997] IRLR 92 NICA 
para 76, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held that if one of the groups subject 
to separate collective bargaining is made up of predominantly females then a 
Tribunal should ascertain the reason for the wage difference, in particular whether it 
is due to sex discrimination. In a dissenting judgment McCollum J held that "[i]n my 
view, in the circumstances of this case, the separate pay structures were capable of 
amounting to a material factor free of the taint of sex discrimination, as the 
percentage of women in the less well paid group was not so high as to lead inevitably 
to a finding of indirect discrimination" (para 44). 
78  Benveniste v University of Southampton [1989] IRLR 123 CA. 
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and the respondent regarding her low salary as compared with that of her 
four male comparators. This resulted in the appellant being dismissed by 
the respondent. The appellant claimed equal pay for like work in the 
Industrial Tribunal. This claim was dismissed. The appellant then appealed 
to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which appeal was also dismissed. The 
Court of Appeal held that once the financial constraints on the respondent 
came to an end in 1982, the reason for paying the appellant a lower salary 
disappeared. It further held that "… [it was] not persuaded that it can be right 
that the appellant should continue to be paid on a lower scale once the 
reason for payment at the lower scale has been removed". It reasoned that 
the material difference between the rate of pay between the appellant and 
that of her comparators had evaporated. It noted that there was no evidence 
to the effect that the respondent was under continuing financial constraints. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the 
Industrial Tribunal for the determination of a suitable remedy.79 Financial 
constraints can justify pay differentials. This, however, is limited to the 
existence or continuation of the financial constraints. Once the financial 
constraints have ceased to exist then they lose their status as grounds to 
justify pay differentials. Where the financial constraints are of a continuing 
nature, then this can operate as a justification to pay differentials. The 
existence or continuation of the financial constraints must, however, be 
genuine. 
In Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated Cases Lurgan (Limited)80 the Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal heard an appeal from the Industrial Tribunal by way 
of a stated case. The following question was posed in the stated case: 
"[w]as the tribunal correct in law to hold that the protection afforded by the 
material difference of red-circling81 is not time limited?" The Court of Appeal 
held that the length of time in respect of which pay differentials had endured 
due to red-circling is not irrelevant to the issue of whether it can continue to 
be a general material factor. It explained that in order for red-circling to 
qualify as a general material factor defence to pay differentials, the reason 
for its existence or continuation at the time the pay differential is being 
challenged is of cardinal importance and must be examined. It further held 
that "[i]t is wrong to assume that because it was right to institute the system, 
                                            
79  Benveniste v University of Southampton [1989] IRLR 123 CA.paras 4-5, 10, 12, 14, 
30-32. 
80  Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated Cases Lurgan (Limited) [2009] IRLR 132 NICA. 
81  Red-circling is a pay protection measure which protects an employee's salary even 
in circumstances where his duties have lessened (Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated 
Cases Lurgan (Limited) [2009] IRLR 132 NICA para 3). Also see Bury Metropolitan 
Council v Hamilton [2011] IRLR 358 EAT, wherein the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
dealt with pay protection claims. 
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that it will remain right to maintain it indefinitely". The Court of Appeal 
answered the above question in the negative and allowed the appeal.82 A 
defence to an equal pay claim cannot be valid in perpetuity without its 
validity being examined at the time when a claim of equal pay is made. It 
may be that the application is valid in perpetuity, but this must be proved at 
the stage when it is raised as a defence. Allowing the defence of red-circling 
to be valid in perpetuity because the reason for its initial implementation was 
justified would allow unscrupulous employers to rely on the defence even 
where the reason for the initial implementation of the red-circling had 
ceased to exist.83 
In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board84 the appellant female was 
employed by the respondent as a prosthetist. She claimed equal pay to that 
of her chosen male comparator, who was also employed by the respondent 
as a prosthetist. The respondent had offered the comparator a higher 
starting salary (£6,680) than that offered to the appellant (£4,733). The 
respondent alleged that the higher starting salary was to attract the 
                                            
82  Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated Cases Lurgan (Limited) [2009] IRLR 132 NICA paras 
1-2, 12, 15, 17. In Snoxell v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1977] IRLR 123 EAT, the female 
appellants were employed as inspectors of motor machine parts by the respondent. 
They claimed that they were being paid less than certain of their male counterparts 
who were red-circled, for doing the same work. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed 
their claims and upheld the defence of red-circling as raised by the respondent. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal disagreed with the Tribunal and held that the inevitable 
conclusion on the evidence was that the female appellants would have been red-
circled had they not been women. The appeal was allowed and the case was 
remitted to the Industrial Tribunal to determine the amount of arrear remuneration 
which the appellants were entitled to (Snoxell v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1977] IRLR 123 
EAT paras 11, 26, 52). In United Buiscuits Ltd v Young [1978] IRLR 15 EAT, the 
respondent, a female packing supervisor employed on day shift claimed that she 
was paid less than her male counterparts who were employed on night shift and 
were red-circled. She sought to be remunerated according to the amount paid to her 
male counterparts. The appellant's reliance on red-circling as the ground justifying 
the pay differentials was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal held that "where an employer seeks to discharge the onus which rests upon 
him under s.1(3) by what may be described as a 'red circle defence', he must do so 
under reference to each employee who it is claimed is within the circle. He must 
prove that at the time when that employee was admitted to the circle his higher 
remuneration was related to a consideration other than sex. It may be that in some 
cases he can rely upon a presumption that considerations which apply to existing 
members of the circle apply to subsequent intrants. But where, as here, these 
considerations are accepted as having eventually disappeared we consider that it is 
for the employer to establish by satisfactory evidence that this occurred after the 
latest intrant was accepted." The Employment Appeal Tribunal accordingly 
dismissed the appeal (United Buiscuits Ltd v Young [1978] IRLR 15 EAT paras 2-3, 
8, 10).  
83  Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated Cases Lurgan (Limited) [2009] IRLR 132 NICA para 
12.  
84  Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26 HL. 
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comparator to work for it. Unlike the comparator, the appellant was not 
offered employment whilst employed for a private company. The appellant's 
claim was dismissed by both the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal. The main question before the House of Lords was whether 
the explanation furnished by the respondent for the pay differential 
constituted a general material factor defence which excluded the difference 
of sex. The House of Lords held that administrative efficiency could 
constitute a genuine material factor defence. It noted and agreed with the 
finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the new prosthetic service would not 
have been established timeously had it not been for the appointment of the 
comparator and others like him who were offered an amount of 
remuneration equal to that which they were receiving from the private 
company. It further held that the comparator was paid more because of the 
need of the respondent to attract him. It concluded that the respondent's 
explanation of the pay differential did amount to a genuine material factor 
defence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.85 Where there is a need 
by the employer to attract an employee to its business for legitimate reasons 
(administrative efficiency), this will amount to a defence which would justify 
consequent pay differentials. 
                                            
85  Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26 HL paras 2-3, 5, 8-9, 11, 
18-22. In Ratcliffe v North Yorkshire County Council [1995] IRLR 439 HL, the 
respondent dismissed the female appellants and rehired them at a lower wage. The 
respondent alleged that it did this because it had to become tender competitive. The 
respondent had lost a tender to another company whose labour costs were 
substantially lower than those of the respondent. The Industrial Tribunal found that 
the need of the respondent to reduce the appellant's wages in order to compete with 
other companies may have been a material factor, but it was due to a factor based 
on the difference of sex. The Tribunal found in favour of the appellants and rejected 
the respondent's explanation as being a justification to the pay differentials. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal overturned the decision of the Tribunal. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The House of Lords, 
however, agreed with the Industrial Tribunal and held that "[t]o reduce the women's 
wages below that of their male comparators was the very kind of discrimination in 
relation to pay which the Act sought to remove" (Ratcliffe v North Yorkshire County 
Council [1995] IRLR 439 HL 439-440). In Albion Shipping Agency v Arnold [1981] 
IRLR 525 EAT para 15, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "as a matter of 
common sense a change in the circumstances of the business in which the man and 
the woman are successively employed can (but not necessary will) constitute a 
'material difference' between her case and his". In British Coal Corporation v Smith; 
North Yorkshire County Council v Rattcliffe [1994] IRLR 342 CA 344, the Court of 
Appeal held that "a "material factor" defence must fail if the employer cannot prove 
that the material factor relied upon was not tainted by sex". In National Coal Board v 
Sherwin [1978] IRLR 122 EAT 123 the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "it is 
no justification for a refusal to pay the same wages to women doing the same work 
as a man to say that the man could not have been recruited for less". 
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In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz86 the European Court of Justice 
held that an employer may rely on objectively justified economic grounds for 
pay differentials. It further held that it is the task of the national court to 
determine whether the explanation furnished by the employer for the pay 
differentials constitutes objectively justified economic grounds. The Court 
noted that the measures adopted by the employer must be appropriate to 
achieving the economic objectives.87 This case makes it clear that an 
employer may rely on economic grounds as a justification to pay 
differentials. It is the duty of the national court to ascertain whether the 
economic grounds relied on are genuine and achieve the objectives sought. 
In Wilson v Health & Safety Executive88 the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal was faced with the following questions relating to a service-related 
criterion which determined pay: "does the employer have to provide 
objective justification for the way he uses such a criterion, and, if so, in what 
circumstances?" The Court of Appeal noted that the use of service-related 
pay scales was common, and as a general rule an employer does not have 
to justify its decision to adopt them because the law acknowledges that 
experience allows an employee to produce better work. It held that an 
employer will have to justify the use of a service-related criterion in detail 
where the employee has furnished evidence which gives rise to serious 
doubts as to whether the use of the service-related criterion is appropriate 
to attain the criterion objective, which is the rendering of better work 
performance by employees with more years of service. In these 
circumstances an employer will have to justify the use of the service-related 
criterion by proving the general rule that an employee with experience 
produces better work and that this is evidenced in its workplace.89 The use 
of a service-related pay criterion is as a general rule legitimate and will be a 
complete defence to an equal pay claim. It is only when an employee 
furnishes evidence which casts serious doubt on whether the criterion is 
appropriate to attain the criterion objective, which is the rendering of better 
work performance by employees with more years of service, that an 
employer will be called upon to justify the criterion by disproving the doubt. 
An employee may therefore challenge a service-pay criterion on this limited 
ground only. 
                                            
86  Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] IRLR 317 ECJ. 
87  Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] IRLR 317 ECJ para 36.  
88  Wilson v Health & Safety Executive [2010] IRLR 59 EWCA. 
89  Wilson v Health & Safety Executive [2010] IRLR 59 EWCA paras 1, 16. 
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In Davies v McCartneys90 the appellant argued before the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal committed an error by relying for 
its finding that the respondent had proved a material factor defence on 
factors which were also used in the assessment of the value of the work. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that there is no limitation to the 
factors which an employer may rely on in proving a material factor defence. 
It stated that the important part of the defence was that it was based on a 
material factor which was genuine and not based on the difference of sex. 
It further held that: 
[h]owever, it is our view that an employer should not be allowed simply to say, 
'I value one demand factor so highly that I pay more', unless his true reason 
for doing so is one which is found by the Tribunal to be reasonable and 
genuine and not attributable to sex.91 
An employer may rely on the factors for assessing the value of work as a 
defence to a pay differential. In this instance, the factors for assessing the 
value of the work are capable of justifying the pay differential for genuine 
reasons which are not sex-tainted. 
5.2.2 Grounds of justification 
It is clear from the above analysis of the case law that the following are 
regarded as defences/grounds of justification to an equal pay claim: (a) the 
comparator was employed on a higher salary scale due to skill and 
experience;92 (b) productivity is rewarded in terms of a bonus system;93 (c) 
collective bargaining;94 (d) financial constraints;95 e) red-circling;96 (f) 
administrative efficiency;97 (g) economic grounds (reasons);98 (h) service-
pay criterion;99 and (i) factors used for assessing the value of work in an 
equal value claim.100 
                                            
90  Davies v McCartneys [1989] IRLR 43 EAT. 
91  Davies v McCartneys [1989] IRLR 43 EAT paras 11, 14-15.  
92  Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling [2012] IRLR 382 EAT at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
93  Council of the City of Sunderland v Brennan [2012] IRLR 507 EWCA at para 5.2.1 
hereof.  
94  Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge (No 2) [2008] IRLR 776 EWCA 
at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
95  Benveniste v University of Southampton [1989] IRLR 123 CA at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
96  Fearnon v Smurfit Corrugated Cases Lurgan (Limited) [2009] IRLR 132 NICA at para 
5.2.1 hereof.  
97  Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26 HL at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
98  Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] IRLR 317 ECJ at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
99  Wilson v Health & Safety Executive [2010] IRLR 59 EWCA at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
100  Davies v McCartneys [1989] IRLR 43 EAT at para 5.2.1 hereof.  
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6 The Statutory Grounds of Justification in terms of the 
Employment Equity Act 
The EEA refers to two grounds of justification to a claim of unfair 
discrimination, namely affirmative action and the inherent requirements of 
the job.101 It should be noted that neither ground of justification in the context 
of equal pay claims has come before the South African courts. It is thus 
apposite to analyse the grounds of justification in the context of equal pay 
claims. It is prudent to deal first with the authorities which have differing 
views regarding the suitability of affirmative action and the inherent 
requirements of the job to operate as grounds of justification to an equal pay 
claim. Thereafter, affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job 
will be analysed in the context of equal pay claims in an attempt to ascertain 
whether or not they constitute suitable grounds of justification. 
In Ntai the Labour Court, dealing with an equal pay claim, remarked obiter 
that the respondent had no legal duty to apply affirmative action measures 
and somehow increase the salaries of the applicants. The Labour Court 
further remarked that the application of an affirmative action measure was 
a defence which could be relied upon by an employer and does not 
constitute a right which an employee could utilise.102 It is clear from the 
obiter remarks made, that the Labour Court regarded affirmative action as 
a suitable defence to an equal pay claim. 
Meintjes-Van der Walt has suggested that a pay differential in the context 
of pay discrimination should not be justified on the grounds of affirmative 
action as there are more constructive ways in which an affirmative action 
plan could be utilised to address past inequalities without implementing new 
differentials.103 The reason for the suggestion that affirmative action is not 
suitable as a ground of justification to an equal remuneration claim is based 
on the view that an affirmative action plan could be used more fruitfully 
elsewhere. 
Landman has suggested that affirmative action is a suitable ground of 
justification to an equal pay claim. He has further suggested that when 
affirmative action is applied in the context of equal pay claims, it may be that 
designated employees are paid more than able-bodied white males, who 
are the only persons who do not belong to a designated group. Whether an 
employer may discriminate within the designated groups by applying 
                                            
101  Davies v McCartneys [1989] IRLR 43 EAT at para 5.2.1 hereof. 
102  Ntai paras 85 - 86. 
103  Meintjes-Van Der Walt 1998 ILJ 30.  
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affirmative action measures is a vexed question. With regard to the inherent 
requirements of the job, Landman has suggested that the justification to 
equal pay claims on this ground is possible in theory.104 
Du Toit et al have suggested that it is difficult to imagine circumstances 
where either affirmative action or the inherent requirements of the job could 
be applicable as grounds of justification to pay discrimination on a prohibited 
ground between employees performing work of equal value.105 Cohen has 
stated that neither the defence of affirmative action nor the inherent 
requirements of the job applies directly to pay discrimination.106 Pieterse has 
suggested that pay-equity legislation should include specific defences to 
pay-equity claims and that it would be beneficial if the legislation specified 
the interface between pay equity principles and affirmative action 
structures.107 Hlongwane has stated that the EEA does not expressly 
provide for defences to pay discrimination, and it is thus difficult to reconcile 
how either the defence of affirmative action or the inherent requirements of 
the job could justify pay discrimination committed on one of the grounds 
referred to in section 6(1) of the EEA.108 
It is clear from the above that there are two views regarding the suitability 
and applicability of affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the 
job to equal pay claims. This results in legal uncertainty, which ultimately 
affects the equal pay legal framework negatively. An analysis is thus needed 
to determine the suitability and applicability of these grounds of justification 
to equal pay claims for the promotion of legal certainty. If one accepts that 
an equal pay claim is justiciable in terms of the EEA, then affirmative action 
and the inherent requirements of the job constitute the grounds of 
justification to an equal pay claim ex lege. A finding that neither constitutes 
a suitable ground of justification to an equal pay claim and that they should 
therefore not apply as such will of necessity have to be based on sound 
arguments and suggestions. Put differently, affirmative action and the 
inherent requirements of the job are grounds of justification to an equal pay 
claim until the contrary is proved. 
                                            
104  Landman 2002 SA Merc LJ 353. 
105  Du Toit et al Labour Law 5th ed 617; Du Toit et al Labour Law 6th ed 707, where the 
following is stated ''Justification of alleged pay discrimination in terms of either of the 
two statutory defences is practically ruled out''. 
106  Cohen 2000 SA Merc LJ 260-261. 
107  Pieterse 2001 SALJ 17. 
108  Hlongwane 2007 LDD 78. It is axiomatic that affirmative action cannot apply as a 
ground of justification to all the grounds referred to in s 6(1) of the EEA with reference 
to equal remuneration claims. Affirmative action applies as a ground of justification 
only where the discrimination is based on sex, gender and/or race. 
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6.1 Affirmative action 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution109 provides that in order to promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative measures may be taken to protect or 
advance persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The 
EEA gives effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution by regulating affirmative 
action in the workplace. In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden110 the 
Constitutional Court stated the following with regard to whether a measure 
falls within section 9(2) of the Constitution: 
It seems to me that to determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) 
the enquiry is threefold. The first yardstick relates to whether the measure 
targets persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination; the second is whether the measure is designed to 
protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third 
requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality111 
It is self-evident that if a measure does not pass the above enquiry then the 
measure is not one contemplated in section 9(2) and is not a remedial 
measure including an affirmative action measure. 
Section 6(2)(a) of the EEA provides that the taking of affirmative action 
measures which are consistent with the purpose of the EEA is not unfair 
discrimination. The purpose of the EEA is to achieve equity in the workplace 
inter alia by implementing affirmative action measures to ensure that 
persons from the designated groups are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce.112 Section 15(2) of the 
EEA prescribes the affirmative action measures to be taken by designated 
employers.113 These measures are: (a) to identify and eliminate 
                                            
109  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the 
"Constitution").  
110  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) (hereafter referred to as 
"Van Heerden").  
111  Minister of Finance v Van Heerden para 37.  
112  Section 2 of the EEA; s 15(1) of the EEA defines affirmative action measures as 
those measures that are "designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from the 
designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably 
represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace of a 
designated employer"; also see Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 259 with 
regard to the comments on the goal of affirmative action.  
113  A designated employer is defined in s 1 of the EEA as: "(a) a person who employs 
50 or more employees; (b) a person who employs fewer than 50 employees but has 
a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the annual turnover of a small 
business as set out in Schedule 4 to the EEA; (c) a municipality as referred to in 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution; (d) an organ of state as referred to in section 239 of 
the Constitution, but excluding, local spheres of government, the National Defence 
Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service; (e) an 
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employment barriers; (b) to diversify the workplace based on equal dignity 
and respect; (c) to reasonably accommodate people from designated 
groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities; and (d) to 
ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from the 
designated groups on all levels in the workforce.114 
These measures must be reflected in the designated employers' 
employment equity plan.115 The measure mentioned in (d) above includes 
preferential treatment and numerical goals.116 The question which arises in 
the context of equal pay claims is whether the preferential treatment as 
contemplated in section 15(3) of the EEA includes paying suitably qualified 
persons from the designated groups more than their non-designated 
counterparts in the workforce in order to ensure equitable representation. 
On a literal reading of section 15(3) read with section 15(2)(d)(i) of the EEA, 
it would seem that it does. This reading is, however, not dispositive of the 
suitability of affirmative action as a ground of justification to equal pay 
claims, as it still has to be analysed in accordance with the purpose of the 
EEA and the matrix relating to equal pay claims. It should be noted that 
chapter 3 of the EEA, which deals extensively with affirmative action, does 
not apply to non-designated employers,117 but non-designated employers 
are nevertheless not exempt from the provisions of section 6(2)(a) of the 
EEA118 which lists affirmative action as one of the grounds of justification to 
an unfair discrimination claim. Therefore, a non-designated employer may 
raise the defence of affirmative action and by implication may take 
affirmative action measures within its workplace.119 The author will, 
                                            
employer bound by a collective agreement as referred to in sections 23 or 31 of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which collective agreement appoints the employer 
as a designated employer". 
114  Section 15(2)(a)-(d)(i) of the EEA. 
115  Section 20(2)(b) of the EEA. Meintjes-Van der Walt 1998 ILJ 32-33 has suggested 
that the implementation of employment equity plans could eradicate pay inequity and 
consequently level the playing fields.  
116  Section 15(3) of the EEA. It is apposite to note that while numerical goals are 
allowed, quotas are not (s 15(3) of the EEA). In Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2014 
2 SA 1 (SCA) para 68 the Supreme Court of Appeal remarked that where numerical 
goals and representivity are applied as absolute criteria to appointments, this 
application would transform the numerical goals into quotas, which are outlawed in 
terms of the EEA.  
117  Section 12 of the EEA. 
118  The section falls within ch 2 of the EEA, which does not exclude non-designated 
employers from its ambit.  
119  See Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 269, who stated that affirmative action 
measures taken by a non-designated employer falls beyond the framework of 
statutory employment equity plans and such an employer will have to prove that it is 
taking affirmative action measures that are consistent with the purpose of the EEA 
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hereinafter, deal with affirmative action only as it relates to designated 
employers.120 
It is apposite to note that affirmative action applies only to suitably qualified 
persons121 from the designated groups.122 The designated groups are 
defined as black people, women, and people with disabilities.123 As a 
corollary to the definition of designated groups it is clear that affirmative 
action may be relied upon as a ground of justification only in circumstances 
where the discrimination is based on race, sex, gender and/or disability. To 
this extent, the justification of affirmative action is of limited application. It 
then follows that affirmative action cannot be relied on as a ground of 
justification in circumstances where the discrimination is based on grounds 
other than, race, sex, gender and/or disability. With the aforementioned in 
mind, it is then prudent to analyse the suitability of this ground of justification 
in relation to equal pay claims. 
In order to analyse affirmative action as a ground of justification to equal 
pay claims, the following question is postulated. Does paying an employee 
from a designated group a higher wage than his/her counterpart from a non-
designated group in order to ensure the equitable representation of 
designated employees in all categories and levels of the workplace amount 
to an affirmative action measure? If it does, it would mean that it may be 
relied upon by an employer as a ground of justification to an equal pay claim 
based on race, sex and/or gender. 
The EEA states that in order to determine whether a designated employer 
is implementing its employment equity plan in accordance with the EEA, 
one must have regard inter alia to the number of suitably qualified 
                                            
as prescribed by s 2 of the Act if it wishes to rely on the ground of justification 
contained in s 6(2)(b) of the EEA. 
120  The comments made, hereinafter, regarding affirmative action as it relates to 
designated employers are instructive to non-designated employers with regard to 
them taking affirmative action measures and raising the same as a ground of 
justification to an equal pay claim.  
121  A suitably qualified person refers to a person who may be qualified for a job as a 
result of one or more of the following factors: formal qualifications; prior learning; 
relevant experience; or capacity to acquire, within a reasonable period, the ability to 
do the job (ss 1 read with 20(3)(a)-(d) of the EEA).  
122  Section 2 of the EEA; s 15(1) of the EEA. 
123  Section 1 of the EEA; black people refers to Africans, Coloured persons and Indians 
(s 1 of the EEA); people with disabilities refers to people who have a long-term 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of 
employment (s 1 of the EEA). In Chinese Association of South Africa v Minister of 
Labour (TPD) (unreported) case number 59251/2007 of 18 June 2007 the High Court 
held that Chinese people who are also South African citizens fall within the ambit of 
the definition of "black people" in s 1 of the EEA.  
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employees from the designated groups from which the employer may 
promote or appoint.124 The EEA does not mention as an affirmative action 
measure the paying of a designated employee more than the employee's 
non-designated counterpart.125 It is submitted that the absence of mention 
of the higher pay as an affirmative action measure coupled with the 
reference to the promotion and appointment of designated employees is a 
strong indication that paying a designated employee more than the 
employee's non-designated counterparts does not fall within the ambit of an 
affirmative action measure. In Van Heerden the Constitutional Court stated 
with reference to the second requirement of the threefold enquiry, inter alia, 
that if the remedial measures display naked preference, are arbitrary or 
capricious, then they cannot amount to measures which are designed to 
achieve the constitutionally authorised end.126 It is further submitted, in the 
light of Van Heerden, that the paying of higher wages as an affirmative 
action measure would amount to naked preference, which would be 
arbitrary. 
Dupper states that affirmative action is a temporary measure that should 
cease operating once it has achieved its goal (measures) and the duration 
of affirmative action programmes is intrinsically linked to the justification 
proffered for their existence. He further states that if the affirmative action 
measures continue to operate notwithstanding the achievement of the 
goals, then this will be regarded as discrimination.127 It is important to note 
that an employment equity plan cannot be shorter than 1 year or longer than 
                                            
124  Section 42(a)(ii) of the EEA. See Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 259, who 
stated that s 42 of the EEA provides important indications as to the meaning of the 
term equitable representation as used in s 2 of the EEA.  
125  Section 15(2) of the EEA. 
126  Van Heerden para 41. 
127  Dupper 2008SAJHR 439; Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 262; McGregor 
2006 JBL 19 has suggested that affirmative action will cease once the past 
imbalances are rectified. See George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1996 
17 ILJ 571 (IC) 593, wherein the Industrial Court remarked that affirmative action is 
an interim measure which is temporary in nature. In Willemse v Patelia [2006] JOL 
18510 (LC) para 73 the Labour Court held that the employer having achieved its 
affirmative action goals was bound in terms of its policy directives to apply the 
criterion of merit with regard to promotion. In Unisa v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 
(LAC) para 30, the Labour Appeal Court held that once the appellant had reached 
its employment targets the preferential treatment (affirmative action) no longer 
applied and appointments were to be made based on merit. Mushariwa 2012 PELJ 
423 has stated that it is cardinal for employers to know if and when they have 
reached their affirmative action targets as a failure to do so will result in non-
designated employees being subject to discrimination which would be unfair.  
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5 years.128 It is thus clear that an affirmative action measure cannot survive 
in perpetuity, as it will come to an end once the objective has been achieved. 
The following further questions are postulated with reference to paying an 
employee from a designated group more than his/her counterpart from a 
non-designated group in order to ensure the equitable representation of 
designated employees in all categories and levels of the workplace. What 
will the lifespan of this measure be? Will the employer pay the employee 
from the designated group a higher salary than a non-designated employee 
in perpetuity? The answer to these questions will be set out in the form of 
an example. 
For example, with regard to an affirmative action measure regarding 
appointments (or promotions) of designated persons, the employment 
equity plan refers to the target of 50% designated employees in all 
categories and levels of the workplace. Once the employer has reached the 
target of appointing (promoting) 50% of designated employees in its employ, 
then the target has been achieved and the affirmative action measure in that 
regard has come to an end. This means that the affirmative action measure 
can no longer apply, and if it does, this ultra vires application will be 
regarded as discrimination which will be unfair. It is difficult to postulate a 
similar example with the measure being paying a higher salary to 
designated employees as an affirmative action measure. The difficulty lies 
in determining the lifespan of the measure, and this results from the 
measure itself. It is submitted that paying higher wages should not be 
regarded as an affirmative action measure due to its impracticality and the 
creation of new pay differentials innate in its application.129 In Van Heerden 
the Constitutional Court stated with reference to the third requirement of the 
threefold test, inter alia, that a remedial measure must not impose 
substantial and undue harm or constitute an abuse of power on those who 
are excluded from its benefits, as this will threaten the country's long-term 
constitutional goal of equality.130 It is submitted that, based on this, the 
paying of higher wages should not be regarded as an affirmative action 
measure due to the potential substantial and undue harm that it would cause 
to those who are excluded from its benefits. 
                                            
128  Section 20(1)(e) of the EEA.  
129  This suggestion is supported by s 27(2) of the EEA, which provides that a designated 
employer must implement measures to reduce disproportionate pay differentials. 
See Hlongwane 2007 LDD 81-82 and Pieterse 2001 SALJ 14 for a general 
discussion of s 27 of the EEA.  
130  Van Heerden para 44.  
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In the light of the above analysis, it is finally submitted that affirmative action 
is not a suitable ground of justification to equal pay claims. 
6.2 Inherent requirements of the job 
Inherent requirements of the job are not defined in the EEA but they have 
been given meaning by the Courts. Article 2 of the Discrimination 
Convention states that any distinction, exclusion, or preference in respect 
of a particular job based on its inherent requirements will not be deemed to 
be discrimination.131 The Discrimination Convention, however, does not 
provide a definition for the term "inherent requirements of the job". It is then 
necessary to analyse the meaning of this as developed by the case law. 
In Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd132 the Labour Court defined an 
inherent requirement of a job as referring to an indispensable attribute which 
must relate in an inescapable way to the performing of the job.133 In 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead134 the Labour Appeal Court adopted a 
more flexible approach than the Labour Court by finding that rational and 
commercially understandable considerations constituted adequate 
justification to a claim of discrimination on the ground of pregnancy.135 In 
Ntai the Labour Court rejected mere commercial reasons as a justification 
and adopted a strict approach which is akin to business necessity.136 Du 
Toit et al suggest that a commercial rationale cannot by itself establish an 
inherent requirement of the job, and clear evidence regarding the nature of 
the requirement of the job should be led to place the court in a position to 
make a finding as to whether or not the employer's decision based on that 
requirement is reasonable.137 
In Lagadien v University of Cape Town138 the Labour Court found that 
proven skills, experience and knowledge were indispensable requirements 
for the particular job and the refusal to appoint a person who lacked these 
qualities was permissible within the meaning of the inherent requirements 
                                            
131  Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 111 of 1958.  
132  Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1999 8 BLLR 862 (LC). 
133  Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1999 8 BLLR 862 (LC) para 34; also see 
Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law 5-15 (fn 72), wherein the 
authors have suggested that notwithstanding the overturning of the Labour Court's 
decision by the Labour Appeal Court, the former court's definition of the inherent 
requirements of the job has not been affected and remains intact. 
134  Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 2000 6 BLLR 640 (LAC). 
135  Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 2000 6 BLLR 640 (LAC) 688.  
136  Ntai para 88. 
137  Du Toit et al Labour Law 5th ed 607. 
138  Lagadien v University of Cape Town 2001 1 BLLR 76 (LC). 
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of the job as espoused in section 6(2)(b) of the EEA.139 Naidu has stated 
that inherent requirements of the job are requirements that cannot be 
removed from the job without radically changing the nature of the job, and 
a job that can be performed without imposing the requirements fails the 
test.140 
Dupper and Garbers have stated that it can be inferred from the phrase 
"inherent requirement of a job" that "only essential job duties should be 
taken into account and that if the requirement is not met, the job cannot be 
done".141 Du Toit et al have suggested that the inherent requirements of the 
job should be analysed within the matrix of the following criteria: (i) they 
must be a permanent feature of the job; (ii) they must be essential to the 
job; and iii) they must be indispensable to the performance of the work.142  
It is important to analyse the possibility of the ground of justification being 
applied to an equal pay claim by way of examples. 
A and B perform equal work, but A is paid less than B and alleges that the 
pay discrimination is based on race as A is a black male and B is a white 
male. The employer will not be able to rely successfully on the inherent 
requirements of the job as a justification to the pay discrimination because 
A and B perform equal work, meaning that they both comply with the 
inherent requirements of the job. This example is based on the assumption 
that A proves the racial discrimination and the onus then shifts to the 
employer to justify the discrimination. 
A and B perform work of equal value, but A is paid less than B and alleges 
that the pay discrimination is based on race as A is a black male and B is a 
white male. The employer will not be able to rely on the inherent 
requirements of the job as a justification to pay discrimination because 
different requirements are envisaged by the concept equal value and the 
requirements of the two jobs will of necessity be different but may be proven 
to be of equal value. This example is based on the assumption that A proves 
the racial discrimination and the onus then shifts to the employer to justify 
the discrimination. 
                                            
139  Lagadien v University of Cape Town 2001 1 BLLR 76 (LC) 83.  
140  Naidu 1998 SA Merc LJ 181.  
141  Dupper and Garbers "Justifying Discrimination" 83.  
142  Du Toit et al Labour Law 5th ed 608.  
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In the light of the above analysis, it is submitted that the inherent 
requirements of the job is not a suitable ground of justification to equal pay 
claims. 
7 Conclusion 
It is clear from South African law that affirmative action and the inherent 
requirements of the job have not been used as grounds of justification to 
equal pay claims. The equal pay laws of the United Kingdom do not refer to 
affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job as grounds 
justifying pay differentiation. It is important to note that the factors listed in 
the Employment Equity Regulations are more in line with the grounds of 
justification to equal pay claims as found in the case law of South Africa and 
the United Kingdom. This substantiates the argument that affirmative action 
and the inherent requirements of the job are not suitable as grounds of 
justification to equal pay claims.143 It will thus be important to mention that 
section 6(2) of the EEA does not apply to equal pay claims under section 
6(4) of the EEA, as this will avoid unnecessary litigation regarding this 
aspect and it will at the same time promote legal certainty, which will 
strengthen the equal pay legal framework. This should be mentioned in the 
form of an amendment to section 6 of the EEA as follows: "The grounds of 
justification listed in section 6(2)(a)-(b) are not applicable to a claim under 
section 6(4)."144 
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